试论孟子对告子人性论的超越

On Mencius’ Transcending of Gao Zi’s Theory of Human Nature

先秦时,告子从“生之谓性”的前提出发,提出了“性无善无不善”论,与此相对,孟子提出了“性善论”。孟子坚定地认为人性本善,强调了人心修为的重要性,把人性问题诉诸个人的道德自觉,突显了道德修养的个人责任和行为主体在这种“成己”的修养中的道德自律性,实现了对告子人性论的超越。

Human nature issue aroused controversy among ancient Chinese philosophers, especially Confucianists, on which opinions differed greatly before Qin Dynasty. Gao Zi, according to the premise ＂nature is born＂, forwarded the theory that ＂human nature is of no good or good＂; on the contrary, Mencius advanced the theory ＂human nature is good＂. He negated that human nature is of no good. The moral source of good human nature-that＇s why humans are humans-was based on the inborn innermost being, which is innate. Mencius, proceeding from the innermost being of humans, emphasized the importance of cultivating one＇s original nature and thought that human nature depended on one＇s moral consciousness, which shows moral cultivation＇s individual responsibility and behavioral subject＇s moral self-discipline in the growth of humans, thus transcending Gao Zi＇s theory of human nature.