组织间权威对交易分配和投资积极性的影响

The Effects of Power between Inter-Organizations on Transaction Allocation and Investment Activity

企业投资决策是事前行为,而交易分配事后才能明确,当企业无法控制交易分配时,其投资积极性会受影响。论文从独立决策、卖方控制和买方控制三方面分析了组织间权威在交易分配中的作用,认为在独立决策时,企业因事后交易的不确定性而存在投资不足;而在卖方控制或买方控制的情况下,拥有权威的一方存在投资过剩,不拥有权威的一方则投资积极性不足。因此,当一方的投资对于社会总收益创造更为重要时,应由其拥有权威。

Firm＇s investment is assumed to be ex ante but transaction is ex post contractible. Lack of control of transaction affects firm＇ s investment activity. This paper analyzes three cases： （1） when firms make decision non- cooperatively, the inefficiency arises and ex ante investments are lower; （2） when the sailor （buyer） has transaction decision power, then the power owner makes over investment and the other is under investment. So the power should be attributed to the firm whose investment is more important.