摘要
企业投资决策是事前行为,而交易分配事后才能明确,当企业无法控制交易分配时,其投资积极性会受影响。论文从独立决策、卖方控制和买方控制三方面分析了组织间权威在交易分配中的作用,认为在独立决策时,企业因事后交易的不确定性而存在投资不足;而在卖方控制或买方控制的情况下,拥有权威的一方存在投资过剩,不拥有权威的一方则投资积极性不足。因此,当一方的投资对于社会总收益创造更为重要时,应由其拥有权威。
Firm's investment is assumed to be ex ante but transaction is ex post contractible. Lack of control of transaction affects firm' s investment activity. This paper analyzes three cases: (1) when firms make decision non- cooperatively, the inefficiency arises and ex ante investments are lower; (2) when the sailor (buyer) has transaction decision power, then the power owner makes over investment and the other is under investment. So the power should be attributed to the firm whose investment is more important.
出处
《商业经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第2期48-52,共5页
Journal of Business Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目资助(70502018)
关键词
交易分配
投资积极性
组织间权威
transaction allocation
investment motivation
power between inter- organizations