惩罚对煤矿违规生产威慑作用的理论分析

The theoretical analysis on deterrence function of punishment to coal mine production violating rules

通过建立模型,分析了“惩罚”对煤矿违规生产行为的威慑作用,指出对事故发生的威慑是有成本的,对事故减少的社会有效威慑水平是由事故减少的边际社会收益和边际社会成本共同决定,决策者应当选择具有相同威慑作用的低成本方式或给定支出水平下的最大化威慑,并有针对性地提出一些合理化建议。

Through establishing model, this article analyzes the deterrence function of punishment to coal mine production violating rules, it points out that the deterrence to accident has its cost, the effective social deterrence level to reduce accident is comely decided by its boundary social benefit and cost, the decision maker should select the low cost method with same deterrence level or the max. deterrence at given expenditure level, the article also put forward some rationalization proposals.