马克思实践本体论:一个再辩护

Marx’s Practical Ontology: A Re-advocacy

马克思实践本体论面临的主要诘难是:实践作为一经验事实不能成为逻辑在先的初始范畴;自然界对于人的活动具有前提性,对于人的存在具有时间上的优先性。其实,实践不同于一般经验事实的独特性在于它对一切可能的"在者"的开启性,正因如此,实践才有足够的资格成为本体范畴。自然界的前提性和优先性不足以成为物质本体论赖以成立的理由,相反,实践范畴之原初性的凸显,使其在本体论语境中失去意义。实践本体论所昭示的是"第三条道路",即介于思辨哲学和自然科学之间的、与现象学—解释学具有相类似之旨趣的独特进路。它的确立宣告了那些未曾与实践"谋面"从而未能真正回归于实践的哲学的寿终正寝。

Marx＇ s ontology is confronted with the main close questions ： practice as the fact of experience can not become the primitive category with logics at first; nature is precondition of the action of human beings, it has preference for the existence of human beings. Actually, the uniqueness of practice different from the common experienced facts is its unlocking for the other possible ＂existence＂, therefore practice is qualified to become the ontological category. Precondition and preference in the natural field fall short of the sake to construct ontology. The other way round, the appearance of primacy of practical category loses its meaning in the context of ontology. Ontology of Practice declares the ＂third Road＂, i.e. the unique forward way between speculation philosophy and natural science, its subject is similar phenomenology - hermeneutics. Its establishment declares the ＂disappearance＂ of philosophy which have not met with practice, and it has not return to practice.