公司治理中股权制衡的博弈分析

Game Theory of Check-and-Balance of Stock Ownership in Corporate Governance

通过股权制衡的完全信息和不完全信息的静态、动态博弈分析,研究公司治理中控股股东和非控股股东的行为关系。结果表明,在完全信息静态博弈下,控股股东侵占的最优选择取决于非控股股东监督的概率;在完全信息动态博弈下,控股股东侵占是对非控股股东采取策略的最佳反应;在不完全信息动态博弈情况下,控股股东会利用信息的不完全性,始终选择侵占;在重复博弈的条件下,有(不监督,不侵占)策略存在的可能性。最后就相应的结论给出一些建议。

This paper first analyzes the behavior of the controlling and non-controlling shareholders by static and dynamic game with the complete and incomplete information. We can get these results that first-best choice of the controlling minority lies in supervisory probability of non-controlling shareholders under static game with complete information;invasion of controlling shareholder is the best reaction to non-controlling shareholders with strategy under dynamic game with complete information; invasion is always chosen by controlling shareholder under dynamic game with incomplete information;and that the strategy （non-supervision, non-invasion） may be in existence under repeated game. Finally, some proposals are presented for the results.