华沙渠道与中美关系解冻:华盛顿决策内幕

Warsaw Channel and Sino-American relaxation: Inside Story of the American Decision-making

在冷战的国际大背景下,尼克松政府对苏实施的“缓和”战略使得华盛顿打出“中国牌”,致力于改善同北京的关系。而1969年3月中苏边界武装冲突则为美提供了一个契机。在寻求同中国对话的渠道上,华盛顿首先想到的是华沙渠道,即第135次和136次中美大使级会谈,并为此做了充分的准备。尽管史实证明:华沙渠道的进展不像华盛顿期望的那样顺利,但基本上完成了预期的任务:表达了改善对华关系的愿望,并阐明了不会同苏联合作主宰东亚事务的立场。在华沙渠道完成了既定任务之后,华盛顿又将同北京的联络转为巴基斯坦渠道。

Against the general international background of Cold War, the detente strategy adopted by the Nixon administration towards the Soviet Union induced Washington to play the 'China card' and make great efforts to improve relations with Beijing. The armed clash on the Sino-Soviet border in March 1969 provided an opportunity for the American side. In its efforts to look for a channel to have dialogue with China, Washington first hit upon the Warsaw channel, i.e., the 135th and 136th Sino-American talks at ambassadorial level in Warsaw and made full preparations. Historical facts proved that the Warsaw channel did not progress as smoothly as Washington had expected but America's expectations were basically fulfilled: the American side expressed its aspiration for improving its relations with China and made clear its stand that it would not collaborate with the Soviet Union to dominate the affairs of Southeast Asia. With the Warsaw channel having fulfilled its mission, Washington switched its contacts with Beijing to the Pakistan channel.