期刊文献+

基于前摄性信息和效用函数的卖方联合形成机制

Seller coalition formation with proactive information and utility function
下载PDF
导出
摘要 将前摄性信息传递机制引入到电子市场多agent卖方联合.Agent在涉及新领域时原有的联合经验往往不可用,此时可以利用其他agent的联合经验快速形成联合.为克服由于a-gent的自利性而有效前摄性信息传递较少的情况,利用效用激励的方式使得agent主动提供前摄性信息.通过利用前摄性信息传递形成联合,能够缩短联合形成时间,减少通信开销. This article describes how to introduce proactive information into seller coalition. The experience in coalition will be useless when the agent try to work in a new field, and it could make use of other's experiences in order to format coalition quickly. In order to shorten the time of coalition formation and to reduce the consumption of communicating, utility allocation will be used to overcome the reduction of useful proactive information due to agents' itself. The time and communication spending of coalition formation with proactive information will be shorter than that of normal coalition formation.
出处 《山东理工大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2007年第2期21-24,共4页 Journal of Shandong University of Technology:Natural Science Edition
关键词 agent联合形成 前摄性信息 效用分配 agent coalition formation proactive information utility allocation
  • 相关文献

参考文献5

  • 1Perez-Castrillo D, Wettstein D. Bidding for the Surplus: A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value [J]. J of Economic Theory, 2001,100(2) : 274-294.
  • 2罗翊,石纯一.Agent协作求解中形成联盟的行为策略[J].计算机学报,1997,20(11):961-965. 被引量:48
  • 3夏娜,蒋建国,于春华,吴琼.一种基于利益均衡的联盟形成策略[J].控制与决策,2005,20(12):1426-1428. 被引量:16
  • 4Fan X, Yen J, Volz RA. A theoretical framework on proactire information exchange in agent teamwork[J]. Artificial Intelligence, 2005, 169:23-97.
  • 5Fan X, Yen J. Conversation Pattern-based Anticipation of Teammates' Information Needs via Overhearing[J]. Intelligent Agent Technology[C]. Washiongton. D C: IEEE Cemputer Society, 2005:316-322.

二级参考文献7

  • 1Zoltkin G, Rosenschein J S. Coalition, Cryptography, and Stability: Mechanisms for Coalition Formation in Task Oriented Domains [A]. Proc of the National Conf on Artificial Intelligence [C]. Seattle: AAAI Press, 1994: 432-437.
  • 2Sandholm T W, Lesser V R. Coalition Among Computationally Bounded Agents [J]. Artificial Intelligence, 1997, 94(1): 99-137.
  • 3Perez-Castrillo D, Wettstein D. Bidding for the Surplus: A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value [J]. J of Economic Theory, 2001, 100(2): 274-294.
  • 4Leen K S, Costas T. Utility-based Multiagent Coalition Formation with Incomplete Information and Time Constraints [A]. Proc of SMC-03 [C]. Washington, DC: IEEE Press, 2003:1481-1486.
  • 5Leen K S, Costas T. Real-time Satisficing Multiagent Coalition formation[A]. Working Notes of the AAAI Workshop on Coalition Formation in Dynamic Multiagent Environments[C]. Menlo Park: AAAI Press, 2002:7-15.
  • 6Maria V B, Ricardo C, Jose L P, et al. A Stable and Feasible Payoff Division for Coalition Formation in a Class of Task Oriented Domains [A]. Proc of the 8th Int Workshop on Intelligent Agents Ⅷ[C]. London: Springer-Verlag Press, 2002: 324-334.
  • 7罗翊,石纯一.Agent协作求解中形成联盟的行为策略[J].计算机学报,1997,20(11):961-965. 被引量:48

共引文献57

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部