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供应商选择中的动态博弈与激励机制 被引量:3

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摘要 本文以博弈论作为理论基础,建立了供应商选择过程中的动态博弈模型及相应的激励机制,并研究了在不完全信息下如何对供应商的订单进行分配的问题。
机构地区 兰州商学院
出处 《财贸经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第4期112-116,共5页 Finance & Trade Economics
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参考文献6

  • 1Esther Hauk, Resemarie Nagel. Choice of partners in multiple two - person prisoner' s dilemma games. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(6), 2001,pp. 770-793.
  • 2Henk de Vos, Rita Smaniotto, Donald A Elsas. Reciprocal altruism under conditions of partner selection. Rationality and Society, 13(2), 2001 ,pp. 139 - 183.
  • 3Naiqi Wu, Ping Su. Selection of partners in virtual enterprise paradigm. Robotics and Computer-Integrated Manufacturing, 21 (2),2005, pp. 119- 131.
  • 4Kaihara, T Fujii S, Sato H. A study on partnering algorithm based on N-person cooperative game in virtual enterprise. SICE 2002. Proceedings of the 41st SICE Annual Conference , 2,2002, pp. 1378 - 1379.
  • 5袁锋,陈晓剑,朱宁.信号传递与R&D合作伙伴的选择[J].中国软科学,2004(11):110-113. 被引量:7
  • 6李世新,刘飞,刘军,杨育.供应链企业合作问题的博弈研究[J].机械工程学报,2003,39(2):123-128. 被引量:11

二级参考文献6

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