中国轿车行业的合谋与价格战被引量：13

Collusion and Price War of Automobile Industry in China

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摘要本文对2002-2004年中国轿车厂商的竞争行为进行假设检验。结果表明:2004上半年轿车行业体现出“内资集团价格战”的特征;在价格战之前,合谋集团的“内资纽带”特征非常明显;而在价格战之后,合谋集团的“外资纽带”特征更加鲜明。基于需求冲击的价格战解释不能令人满意。而从产品差异化程度的变化出发,配合中国轿车行业的合资特征,不仅能够解释价格战,而且能解释价格战前后合谋集团特征的变化。 This article tests the hypotheses of automobile manufacturers＇ behavior during 2002 -2004 in China. The result shows that there is a price war occurring among them in the first half of year 2004. And also the collusion coalitions before and after the price war were different. The classic theories fail to give a satisfactory explain of all these facts. A better explanation should concern about the product differentiation and the joint venture character of China＇s automobile industry.

作者王皓周黎安

机构地区对外经济贸易大学国际商学院北京大学光华管理学院

出处《金融研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第02A期156-165,共10页 Journal of Financial Research

关键词合谋价格战产品差异化轿车 collusion, price war, product differentiation, automobile

分类号 F426.471 [经济管理—产业经济] F224 [经济管理—国民经济]

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参考文献14

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