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我国软件市场盗版现象博弈分析 被引量:2

An Analysis of Software Piracy from Perspective of Game Theory
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摘要 从博弈论的角度对软件盗版现象进行了分析。根据正版厂商和盗版厂商、监管部门与盗版厂商、政府与监管部门之间的关系分别建立了相应的支付矩阵,应用博弈理论对各种情况下的均衡解进行研究。最后得出了治理软件盗版现象的对策为政府与执法部门之间精炼纳什均衡为{奖励,努力}以及正版厂商与盗版厂商之间的纳什均衡为{低价,不盗版}。 The phenomenon of software piracy is investigated from the perspective of game theory. On the basis of the relationship between producer, pirate, government and administration, a series of game models are established to find the Nash equilibrium. Useful measures are also formulated against software piracy.
出处 《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》 2007年第2期62-64,83,共4页 Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology:Social Sciences Edition
关键词 盗版 博弈 纳什均衡 software piracy game Nash equilibrium
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共引文献16

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