期刊文献+

投机资本攻击一国汇率的博弈均衡

Gaming Equilibrium for Speculative Capital Attacking Exchange Rate of a Country
下载PDF
导出
摘要 在经济全球化和金融自由化背景下,国际投机资本的力量快速膨胀,国际游资利用金融杠杆掠夺危机国的财富,使国际金融市场的稳定受到严重挑战。通过构建两个不完全信息下微观主体的博弈模型,揭示国际投机者做出投机攻击决策的依据和博弈中货币当局败北的原因,创造性地提出“抗投机攻击指数”的概念,用以判断一国外汇市场的稳定,为我国在金融市场对外开放过程中采取有效政策搭配、实现内外均衡提供参考。 Owing to economy globalization and finance liberalization, the strength of international speculative capital has expanded rapidly ; international hot money plunders the wealth of the crisis country by using financial leverage, the stability of international financial market subjected to serious challenge. By setting up two gaming models for the microcosmic main bodies under incomplete information, the paper discloses the basis for attacking decisions made by international speculators and causes for the failure of monetary authorities in the games, with a creative proposal of " combating speculative attacking indicator" conception, by means of which the stability of a country's foreign exchange market is to be judged, giving a reference for China's financial market to adopt matching effective policies in the course of opening up to the outside in order to realize internal and external equilibrium.
作者 郭清马
出处 《河南金融管理干部学院学报》 2007年第2期13-16,共4页 Journal of Henan College of Financial Management Cadres
关键词 货币危机 投机资本 博弈均衡 抗投机攻击指数 currency crisis speculative capital gaming equilibrium combating speculative attacking indicator
  • 相关文献

参考文献4

二级参考文献1

共引文献52

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部