金融稳定与货币稳定——基于信息约束经济中央银行独立性的分析

Financial Stability and Monetary Stability:In View of Central Bank's Dependence in the Information Restricted Economy

以中国金融制度为基础,结合货币稳定、金融稳定的有关理论,本文构建了央行、政府和金融机构等部门的决策函数,从而将央行独立性、货币稳定及金融稳定纳入统一框架之下进行分析。本文认为,信息约束下金融机构对央行货币政策的倒逼机制不但使央行独立性受挫,而且导致了金融稳定与货币稳定的冲突;信息约束和政府增长偏好进而导致货币与金融双稳定政策屈服于高经济增长政策,从而加剧了通胀风险;居民被动地为通货膨胀、金融风险买单。本文并认为重新设计保证央行独立性的协调机制非常必要。

This paper reviews the literatures on the relationships between financial stability and monetary stability,constructs an information -restricted model between government, central bank and financial institutions based on the practice of Chinese central bank stabilization policy. Conclusions are as follows： Firstly, faced with financial institutions having false added liquid risk and canvassing for central bank, because of information restriction, the micro - dependence is frustrated, money stability is bend to financial stability. Secondly, mace with strong - government having the partial economic development, because of information restriction, the macro- dependence is frustrated. Thirdly, when financial institutions getting ＂bluff income＂ and government getting good achievement in their post, households have to take inflation cost and the liquid risk. Finally, it is important to design a mechanism to assure the micro and macro - dependence of central bank and to assure financial stability, monetary stability and economic development.