期刊文献+

跨国公司与国内企业之间的非对称研发竞争 被引量:1

Asymmetric R&D Competition between Multinational Corporations and Domestic Corporations
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摘要 同跨国公司相比,国内企业的融资能力受到资本市场的限制,这削弱了其参与研发竞争的能力。本文建立了一个动态博弈模型来分析这一状况。研究表明,跨国公司存在一种研发竞争策略,即通过更激进的产品市场攻势,来对国内企业施加融资限制,进而扩大其研发竞争优势。这一策略增加了跨国公司垄断技术产品市场的可能性。 Compared with multinational corporations, China's domestic firms are faced with more financing constraints. This may weaken their capacities to be engaged in R&D competition. We build a dynamic game model to formalize this situation. Our results show that there is a R&D competition strategy, by which multinational corporations are engaged in more aggressive product market competition to impose stronger financial constraints on domestic firms, so that they can increase their advantage in R&D. This strategy can increase the probability that multinational corporations monopolize product markets.
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSCD 2007年第2期143-148,共6页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572087)
关键词 技术创新 研发竞争 动态博弈 融资约束 technological innovation R&D competition dynamic game financing constraint
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参考文献8

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