可想象性论证与后天必然性

Conceivability Argument and Posterior Necessity

当面临可想象性论证对心灵哲学中的物理主义命题的挑战时,一种突出的策略是借用克里普克关于后天必然性的论述,然后辩论说物理主义命题中包含了一种独立于我们认知想象的、形而上学的必然性。本文介绍讨论了这种类型的论证并指出它们都不能为所谓的“形而上学必然性”提供合理的依据。可想象性论证对物理主义的挑战依然存在,对这一论证的探讨涉及一些语言哲学与形而上学中的重要课题。

While facing the challenge to a proposition of materialism in the philosophy of mind posed by conceivability argument, the scholars involved usually prefer the strategy of borrowing Kripke's idea of posterior necessity and then argue that this proposition contains a metaphysical necessity independent of our cognitive imagination. This paper discusses this kind of argument and concludes that it does not hold water. Conceivability argument's challenge to materialism still remains, whose discussion involves some key topics in the philosophy of language and in metaphysics.