利润操纵、股权再融资与资本配置效率研究

The Study of Earnings Management.Equity Refinancing and Efficiency of Resource Allocation

本文研究了资本市场参与者的行为与利润操纵之间的关系,并分析了对资本配置效率的影响效应。大股东通过操纵报告盈余来改变会计盈余的时间分布和误导投资者,从而攫取更多的隐性收益,造成资本市场配置效率的降低。研究结果表明:(1)大股东通过利润操纵在股权再融资过程中可以获得中小股东无法得到的隐性收益;(2)大股东的收益随着利润操纵程度的增加而提升,中小股东的财富随着利润操纵程度的增加而降低;(3)利润操纵程度的增加将降低上市公司的资本配置效率和企业价值。

This paper mainly analyzes the relationship between market participants and earnings manipulation, and examines earnings manipulation and its effect on efficiency of capital allocation. Large shareholders can change the assessment of the listed companies＇ profit ability and investment values through manipulating the time distribution of earnings, and raise the price of equity and snatch more private benefits. The results suggest that large shareholders can obtain private benefits at the cost of small shareholders through earnings manipulation in the course of equity refinancing, and that the benefits of large shareholders increases with the rising of the degree of earnings manipulation, while the benefits of small shareholders decrease with the rising of the degree of earnings manipulation. The results also show that the efficiency of capital allocation and corporate value will decrease with the rising of the degree of earnings manipulation.