摘要
For the optimum price problem of charging for effluent, this paper analyzes the optimal Pigovian Tax and the serious information asymmetry problem existing in the application process of optimal Pigovian Tax, which is predominant in theory. Then the bilevel system optimizing decision-making theory is applied to give bilevel linear programming decision-making model of charging for effluent, in which the government (environmental protection agency) acts as the upper level decision-making unit and the polluting enterprises act as the lower level decision-making unit. To some extent, the model avoids the serious information asymmetry between the government and the polluting enterprises on charging for effluent.
For the optimum price problem of charging for effluent, this paper analyzes the optimal Pigovian Tax and the serious information asymmetry problem existing in the application process of optimal Pigovian Tax, which is predominant in theory. Then the bilevel system optimizing decision-making theory is applied to give bi- level linear programming decision-making model of charging for effluent, in which the government （ environmen- tal protection agency） acts as the upper level decision-making unit and the polluting enterprises act as the lower level decision-making unit. To some extent, the model avoids the serious information asymmetry between the government and the polluting enterprises on charging for effluent.
基金
the National Social Science Foundation of China(Grant No.04BJY026).
关键词
排污收费
价格控制
双层线性规划模型
信息不对称
charging for effluent
Pigovian Tax
price control
bilevel linear programming
information asymmetry
