权力配置、管理者行为与企业价值

现代财务理论以企业价值最大化为理财目标,如何对管理者实行有效的激励是财务理论研究中一个十分重要的问题。本文通过构建一个关于信息搜集的非合作博弈模型分析了不同的权力配置结构对委托人和代理人的行为所产生的影响,从而从理论上说明了权力如何在股东和管理者之间进行分配将决定企业的价值。

Maximize value is the financial objective in firm which modern financial theory base on.It is a crucial issue that how to effectively encourage manager to perform toward the objective.We construct a noncooperation game about collection information through which we demonstrate that the distribution of power between the shareholders and managers in the corporation determines the value.