工程监理委托代理关系中激励约束与参与约束的研究

A Study About IC and IR in Principal-gent Relationship Under the Engineer Supervision Institution

基于委托-代理理论对工程监理委托-代理关系中的激励约束与参与约束进行若干拓展研究,与参与约束(IR)相比,激励相容约束(IC)更为重要,一个机制不满足激励约束,那将是一个无效机制。业主想要提高工程监理制度的运作效率,就必须通过相应的激励措施诱使工程师努力工作,使“道德风险”得以抑制,为我国工程监理制度的健康发展提供了有益的启示。

According to principal-agent theory, the Incentive compatibility constraint （IC） and the participation constraint （IR） in principal-gent relationship between employer and engineer are analyzed. The conclusions are drawn： The incentive compatibility constraint （IC） is more important than participation constraint （IR）, If the mechanism doesn＇t satisfy the needs of IC, then it will be inefficient. If the employer wants to improve the engineer supervision institution, it must adopt incentive mechanisms which can make the engineer work hard, in the mean time the incentive mechanisms play efficient roles in solving the moral hazard. This paper will provide some implications for engineer supervision development in China.