摘要
文章考察了有关借款人信用信息的两种产生机制。一种是对信用信息的直接生产机制,该机制可以减少信贷市场的信息不对称;一种是通过设置抵押条款,发挥抵押对信用信息的间接信号传递功能。抵押机制并不能直接减少信贷市场的信息不对称,但可以在贷款合约中起着信号、甄别以及激励等作用,消除或减少由信息不对称带来的逆向选择风险和道德风险。
This paper surveyed two engendering mechanisms of borrowers' credit information. One is to directly product credit information, and by means of this mechanism, men can decrease information asymmetric in credit market. Another is using of collateral device in loan contract, and this mechanism is indirect. Collateral may be used as a signaling, screening or incentive device in credit markets characterized by asymmetric information to diminish or decrease loan risk from adverse selection and moral hazard.
出处
《情报科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第5期766-769,共4页
Information Science
关键词
信贷市场
信用信息
抵押
产生机制
credit market
credit information
collateral
engendering mechanism