国有企业经理控制权激励机制解析

Analysis of Incentive Mechanism for Control-Right of Managers in SOEs

国有企业经理掌握着一定的企业控制权,接受着替代性的控制权激励。但这种激励机制存在着理论弊端。我们必须建立一种新的激励机制,使国有企业经理能够获得与其人力资本产权相称的收益,从根本上解决国有企业经理激励问题。

SOEs＇ managers practically handle SOEs＇control-right, receiving substitutive control-right incentive. However this kind of incentive mechanism has its drawbacks. A new incentive mechanism must be built in order that SOEs＇ managers can obtain the lucre which is proportional with their human capital propertyright, and the predicament of managers＇incentive in SOEs can be solved fundamentally.