摘要
地方政府的道德风险在“三农”制度变迁中起着关键性作用。转型时期农民的贫困主要是制度性贫困。征地制度已经成为农民资产流失的最大渠道,它对农民的掠夺已经超过了计划经济时期实行的“剪刀差”。地方政府道德风险造成征地制度的生态环境恶化。解决“三农”难题必须防范和减少地方政府的道德风险。要创新激励和约束机制,实现地方政府、中央政府和全国农民在制度变迁中的激励相容。现实的对策是采取有力措施,壮大农民工的力量,扩大农民的消费者主权。
The moral risk of the local government plays the key role in the variance of "the country, the farmers, and the agriculture" system. In the transformation period farmer' s poverty is mainly caused by system. Land requisition system has been the major way in which the assets of farmers are lost. Its depredation of farmers has outrun "scissors difference" in planned economy. The moral risk of local government worsens the environment of land requisition system. To solve the problem of "the country, the farmers, and the agriculture", the moral risk of local government must be prevented and reduced. The incentive and restriction mechanism should be innovated to harmonize the incentive for local government, central government and farmers of the whole country. The realistic countermeasure is to take powerful measures to strengthen the power of farmer workers and to expand consumers' right of farmers.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第3期106-109,共4页
Economic Survey
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目"工业反哺农业与城乡协调发展战略研究"(05&ZD032)的阶段性成果。
宁波市传媒与文化产业研究基地资助
关键词
地方政府
道德风险
征地制度
local government
moral risk
land requisition system