我国银行业监管低激励相容度分析

Analysis of Low Incentive Compatibility in China's Banking Regulation

我国银行业监管低激励相容度表现在三个方面:首先,法定资本金制度在目前我国信用制度不健全情况下,还不能退出历史舞台,具有低激励相容度;其次,政府注资方案具有低激励相容度;最后,隐性存款担保在中国目前国情下还有其存在的必要,具有低激励相容度。随着我国银行业改革的进一步深入,银行监管低激励相容度应逐步得到提高。

The low incentive compatibility in China＇s banking regulation is manifested in three aspects.Firstly, the legal capital system cannot pass into history at the present stage in our country owing to the imperfect credit system, which has low incentive compatibility.Secondly, capital injection plan from government has low incentive compatibility. Thirdly, implicit deposit guarantee, which is necessary in the present condition of China, also has low incentive compatibility.With the further advancement of banking reform, the low incentive compatibility in Chinese banking regulation will be improved gradually.