摘要
产能过剩和流动性过剩是近年来宏观经济运行出现的新问题,反映了我国宏观经济产业结构的深层次矛盾,二者具有内在的联系。本文从银行监管角度阐述产能和流动性“双过剩”对商业银行风险管理带来的压力,为防止产能和流动性“双过剩”带来银行系统性风险,提出针对性的监管建议。
The initial natural endowments of China's economic system reform decide the process of financial system reform. Since the state has controlled financial returns, the state-owned commercial banks have accumulated a large sum of risks after undergoing the equity structure adjustment which is different from that in other state-owned enterprises. This paper compares the lender's and borrower's entirely different gaming results in the restraint of different law and law execution forces, and analyzes the state-owned enterprise's moral hazard incentive behavior of deliberate evading debts in the course of borrowing money from state-owned commercial banks in an imperfect legal system. The author believes that the vague rights definition in the new "Bankruptcy Law" is detrimental to the protecting creditor's rights and interests.
出处
《金融理论与实践》
北大核心
2007年第5期56-58,共3页
Financial Theory and Practice
关键词
产能过剩
流动性过剩
银行监管
fiducial gaming
unfiducial gaming
moral hazard incentive