董事会领导权结构对审计定价的影响——基于我国A股上市公司2001～2003年度Panel data的分析

CEO Duality Effect on the Auditing Price——Based on Chinese A-stock Market using Panel Data from 2001 to 2003

采用2001～2003年我国A股上市公司董事会领导权设置情况数据，分析了其对于审计定价的影响。研究结果表明，董事会领导权的不同设置对审计定价产生不同的影响，尽管这种影响的效果并不具有统计意义上的显著性。相对于副董事长与总经理两职合一而言，董事长与总经理两职合一不利于降低代理成本，从而迫使审计师降低审计定价。与以往研究结论一致的是，环境动态性变量未对董事会领导权设置情况产生显著影响。

This paper analyzes CEO Duality effect on auditing price about Chinese listed companies of A - stock market from 2001 to 2003.The result indicates that different arrangements about CEO duality have different direction effects on auditing price. Although those effects do not pass the test of confidence coefficient, comparing with assistant CEO duality, CEO duality is not good at decreasing agency cost and auditing price. The result also suggests that environmental dynamic variable have little significant effects on CEO duality.