浅议委托代理问题对企业报酬机制的影响

On the Influence of Principal-agent to Enterprise Salary Mechanism

由于委托—代理的存在使得经理人员经常偏离委托人的目标,代理人就有一定程度背叛委托人目标的行为。这就要求设计一种非常有效的激励机制来约束代理人的背离行为。在实际的运用中,企业要结合自己本身的特征选择适合自己的报酬激励机制来提高企业的价值,增加企业的利润。

In a principal-agent practice, because of deviating principal＇s intention, the agent, to some degree, behaved breach of principal＇s intention, so it is necessary to devise a very effective stimulating mechanism to restrict the agent＇s behavior of breach. In practice, the enterprise needs to choose a proper salary motivation mechanism to increase its value and profits.