委托—代理模型及其在商业银行中的应用

An Application of Principal-agent Theory Into the Commercial Banks

委托—代理理论是契约理论的重要发展。本文将委托—代理理论模型归纳为两个模型,模型Ⅰ采用纯激励机制,模型Ⅱ采用激励和监督混合机制。在纷杂的商业银行企业契约中,最为关键的是所有者和经营者之间的委托—代理关系,因此,我们可以将委托—代理模型应用于商业银行,并以此为基础构建商业银行的激励和约束机制。

The principal - agent theory is an important further - development of Theory of Contracts. This paper rationalized the models of principal - agent theory into two models, model Ⅰ based on an incentive mechanism while model Ⅱ on a mixed mechanism of both monitoring and incentive. The principal - agent relationship plays a critical role in the complex firm contracts among commercial banks, we can therefore apply the model of principal - agent into the commercial banks and set up the incentive and monitoring mechanism for them.