利益集团对贸易政策影响的理论模型研究综述

A Review on the Models Analyzing Influence Interest Group Bring to Trade Policy

在西方民主代议制国家,由于政府与公众、个人与集体之间存在着利益分歧,政府并非以社会福利最大化作为标准制定贸易政策,利益集团往往可以通过众多方式向政府决策者施加政治压力,影响本国贸易政策。围绕着利益集团影响贸易政策的途径、方式以及政府的决策过程,经济学家提出了一系列理论模型,其中包括政治支持模型、游说支出模型、政治捐献模型以及信息传递模型,用以揭示利益集团对贸易政策的影响力以及最终贸易政策取向。

In democracy representative state, government is not supposed to establish trade policy aiming at maximizing social welfare, at the existence of diverges between interests of government and public. Therefore, interest group is capable of bring pressure on policy maker by various means and affecting trade policy. According to different means by which interest group affect trade policy and processes government draw decision, a series of models has been theorized, including Political Support Model, Lobby Cost Model, Political Contribution Model and Information Transmission Model, to reveal the influence Interest Group bring to trade policy and its process.