会计信息失真环境下审计风险的博弈分析

The Game Analysis on Audit Risk in the Disinformation Accounting Condition

从会计信息失真这一角度出发,建立审计风险博弈分析模型.在模型求解的基础上,对注册会计师与企业管理当局之间的博弈进行分析.通过分析得出的结论是:注册会计师由于利益的诱惑,宁愿承担一定的审计风险,出具错误意见的审计报告.由此说明我国目前审计市场上出现注册会计师与被审计单位企业管理当局进行审计合谋的现象.

From the point of accounting disinformation, the game analysis model on audit risk is established. On the basis of solving the model, the game between CPA and the managers of enterprise is analyzed. The conclusion is that CPA would rather present mistaken suggestion to entertain some audit risks at the temptation of interests. Therefore, at present there is a conspiracy between CPA and the managers of enterprise under auditing in audit market in China.