期刊文献+

对风险投资家激励模型的研究

Study on the Incentive Model to the Venture Capitalist
下载PDF
导出
摘要 风险投资家在风险投资过程中起着关键性作用.对风险投资家建立一种激励机制将变得越来越重要.通过对传统激励理论的分析,得出这样结论:制定一种显性的连续支付模式,对风险投资起着一种极强的激励作用,可有效防范风险投资家投资的草率行为,并能缩小投资者的代理成本. The venture capitalist plays a key role in the venture investment. An incentive mechanism is established to the venture capitalist. Based on the analysis of the traditional incentive theory, a conclusion more and more is made that a kind of apparent and continual compensation contract makes a good inspirited effect to the venture investment, and also the capitalist's slapdash behavior can be hold back and the Ventur Investor's agent -cost can be reduced.
作者 刘雪玲
出处 《辽宁大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2007年第2期136-138,共3页 Journal of Liaoning University:Natural Sciences Edition
关键词 风险投资 风险投资家 激励机制 代理成本 合理支付契约. venture investment venture capitalist incentive mechanism agent - cost reasonable compensation contract
  • 相关文献

参考文献2

  • 1Compers P A,Lerner J.An Analysis of Compensation in the U.S.Venture Capital Partnership,Financial Economics[J],1999,51(1):3-44.
  • 2Hellmann F.The Allocation of Control rights in Venture Capital Contracts[J].RAND J,Econnomics,1988,29(1):57-76.

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部