终身教职:一项有效激励研究型大学教师发展的制度安排——基于信息经济学的分析

Tenure:An Incentive Institution for Faculty Development in Research Universities

终身教职作为一项大学教师自由从事科研教学活动的制度保证在高等教育领域,尤其是研究型大学中被广泛采用。但是近年来面对来自各方面的改革压力,有关终身教职制度的争议也越来越多。本文从非对称信息视角出发,利用信息经济学的委托代理理论,为终身教职制度存在的合理性及有效性提供了新的理论解说。并分析了终身教职制度有效实施的条件,进一步指出该制度对激励研究型大学教师发展更具效率上的比较优势。最后,我们还探讨了终身教职制度在中国高校实施的条件和时机。

The institution of tenure is widely implemented in higher education to guarantee the rights of faculty to pursue their research and teaching, especially in research universities. However, in recent years, with the heavy pressure for reforms, the controversies on tenure are growing. This paper, from the perspective of asymmetric information, puts forward a new theoretical explanation for the justification and efficacy of tenure system in a principal-agent model. According to the conditions of implementing tenure system, we argue that it is more efficient in research universities. Based on the above conclusions, the paper also discusses the condition or timing for implementation of tenure in Chinese academics.