关联交易与控制性股东的行为实施：456家上市公司样本

Related Party Transactions and Behaviors of Controlling Shareholders： Samples of 456 Listed Companies

以1998-2002年456家实施配股的上市公司为样本．分析配股后上市公司关联交易的分布特征．以及关联交易对控制性股东资金占用行为、股票收益和企业价值的影响。研究结果表明：控制性股东通过关联借贷大量侵占了上市公司的资金；投资者在关联交易发生后相应调整股票价格。导致了上市公司股票收益下降：控制性股东通过隐蔽的关联交易从上市公司输出财富。造成了以托宾Q衡量的公司价值下降，关联交易与公司价值之间存在负相关关系。非公允关联交易成为控制性股东掠夺中小股东财富的重要方式，导致上市公司的资源被不断输送出去。

This paper investigates 456 seasoned equity offering listed companies in China during the period 1998- 2002 to detect the characteristic of related party transactions between listed companies and their controlling shareholders, and further studies the effects of related party transaction on capital occupation, stock return and firm value. Our analysis shows that large shareholders occupy large amount of money through related party transactions, investors adjust stock prices downwards and stock returns decline, and that controlling shareholders gain private benefits from listed firms by related party transactions and induce negative correlation between related party transactions and firm value measured by Tobin＇s Q. The unfair related party transactions is an important measure of expropriation of controlling shareholders, and induces the resource tunneled out of listed companies.