摘要
讨论可中断负荷(IL)市场的经济补偿模型及报价清算规则,指出参与系统备用服务的IL市场与发电侧备用市场之间的协调对于发电充裕性的重要性。将IL的市场引导方式分为2类,即用户接受停电概率换取的折扣电价补偿与在实际停电后按合约赔偿。两者都可按竞价的市场方式运作,并都在容量事故发生后实施负荷的中断。但前者对应于日常的低代价,且像支付发电侧备用的容量费那样,与停电是否实际发生无关;而后者则对应于小概率的高代价,且像支付发电侧备用的电量费那样,只有在实际停电后才支付。两者的经济特性不同,故具有协调空间。强调以量化指标统一反映系统备用的充裕水平与风险代价,兼顾发电备用的经济性和可靠性。
Economic compensation model and bidding clearing rules for interruptible load （IL） market are discussed and coordination between IL and generation-side reserve capacity for generation adequacy is emphasized. Inducement fashions for IL can be classified into discount price for electricity with certain blackout risk and high compensation for actual blackout occurrence. Both fashions can be operated under certain market rules. Their different economic properties leave some room for coordination. The paper also points out that the risk cost for generation inadequacy can be expressed by IL cost, which can be added into the objective function for the optimization.
出处
《电力系统自动化》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第10期1-6,共6页
Automation of Electric Power Systems
基金
国家重点基础研究发展计划(973计划)资助项目(2004CB217905)
国家自然科学基金重大项目(50595413)
国家电网公司科技项目(SGKJ[2007]98)
Australian Research Council Project(DP0559461)~~
关键词
备用服务
可中断负荷
经济性
充裕性
备用组合优化
风险管理
reserve service
interruptible load
economy
generation adequacy
optimal combination of reserves
risk management
