我国上市公司治理结构与自愿性信息披露关系的研究

Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Corporate Governence of Lised Firms in China

由于我国资本市场起步较晚,经理市场不完善,信息披露质量较差,国有股"一股独大"的现象比较普遍等原因,导致自愿性信息披露对公司治理结构的反作用被淡化。为了使会计信息的重要作用得以实现,使投资者快速地做出正确的投资决策,公司内部治理与外部治理就必须共同完善。上市公司自愿披露相关信息可以从降低公司资本成本、代理成本、交易成本以及通过自愿性信息披露提高上市公司社会形象等方面,获取相应的收益。与此同时,由于自愿性信息的披露,上市公司也承担着对信息的收集、整理、加工、审计的成本以及由于信息披露而带来的竞争劣势成本、诉讼成本、行为管束成本等不能确定的风险隐性成本。

In China the capital market starts later, the manager marketplace is not perfect, the information disclosure is relatively poor, and the State - held share having ＂one strands of alone big＂ phenomenon wait for cause, thus weakening the disclosure governs architectural counteraction to the company. The inside corporate governance and the outside corporate governance should be improved in order to realize the important effect on accounting information and to have the investors make the correct investing decisions rapidly. A Listed company volunteers to reveal relevance information, such as reducing company capital cost , acting for cost , business cost as well as nature information disclosure, to improve a listed company social image and to gain the corresponding avails. Meanwhile, because of the volunteering nature information revealing, a Listed company is also bearing the risk recessive costs which include collecting, arranging, processing, auditing and the competing for inferior position cost, legal action cost, behavior pipe bundle cost.