双层委托代理国库制度的激励机制与银行行为研究

On the Incentive Mechanism of Double-Principal-Agency Treasury Management System and Bank's Action

经理国库作为金融服务重点之一,目前由于激励制度不健全存在着代而不理、效率低、合谋等现象。本文通过建立国家—人民银行—商业银行的优化决策模型、求解,发现国家未能有效激励人行尽职努力;而且商业银行只是把国库看成争取优质客户、拓展其他商业金融服务的桥梁,因此其最优决策就是最大限度地降低经理国库成本、进而有意或无意地影响了国库制度的效率。若改善这一局面,重新设计有效的激励制度是根本。

In the paper the author points out that treasury management system remains some problems because of incomplete incentive mechanism in China, and builds an optimized policy-making model for the government, central bank and commercial banks. The conclusion is that double-agency incentive mechanism doesn＇t have effective incentive to the central bank and commercial banks. Therefore, the key issue is to rebuild an effective incentive mechanism in China.