资本结构与控制权市场发展的四个理论假说及实证检验——以美、日为例

Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control:Four Theoretical Hypotheses and Empirical Study on the U. S. and Japan

资本结构与控制权市场发展之间存在着内在联系,高负债率会降低并购的成功率,由此本文得出了四个理论假说,即低负债率能推动控制权市场的发展;高负债率的资本结构特征直接限制公司控制权市场的发展;出于反收购目的,持续调整会改变资本结构的长期特征引起负债率上升;如果负债率出现下降趋势则控制权市场的发展就会加速。对美、日两国的实证检验较好地验证了这四个假说。这在理论上预示着没有资本结构的剧烈变革,控制权市场就不会有快速的发展。就我国资本结构调整与公司控制权市场发展而言,这个理论预示无论是从金融发展战略选择的层面,还是从多层次资本市场体系建设和国有企业改革的角度来看,其涵义都极为丰富。

There is intrinsic relationship between capital structure and the market for corporate control. This paper proposes four theoretical hypotheses. The empirical analysis of the US and Japan＇s cases tests and verifies the four hypotheses, which suggest theoretically that if there is no dramatic change in capital structure, the market for corporate control can＇t develop rapidly. This suggestion is of great implication for China＇s future adjustment in capital structure and the development of the market for corporate control.