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投标商资金约束下网上单物品最优拍卖设计

Optimal design of online single unit auction with financially constrained buyers
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摘要 针对传统拍卖机制设计所涉及的决策变量较少的弊端,结合网上拍卖的新特点,引入拍卖商的保留价、拍卖时间和投标者到达过程等决策变量,以投标者利润最大化为目标建立相关模型,在考虑投标商资金约束情况下,对单物品在线最优拍卖进行了设计。 In light of the disadvantage of few decision-making variables in the traditional auction mechanism design, this paper, taking the reservation price of the auctioneer, auction time, and the arrival process of bidders into account, proposes the optimal design of online single unit auction with financially constrained buyers aimed at maximizing the auctioneer＇s revenue.
作者 陈胜利 杨晓花 罗云峰
机构地区 华中科技大学系统工程研究所
出处 《武汉科技大学学报》 CAS 2007年第3期315-319,共5页 Journal of Wuhan University of Science and Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(60674083)
关键词 资金约束 在线 单物品 最优拍卖设计 financially-constrained online single unit design of optimal auction
分类号 F716 [经济管理—产业经济]
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参考文献14

  • 1鲁耀斌,文家新,刘笑萍.基于成本约束的在线多数量拍卖模型[J].工业工程与管理,2004,9(6):30-32. 被引量：5
  • 2Lucking-Reiley. Auctions on the internet: what's being auctioned and how[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2000,48 (3): 227-252.
  • 3Beam C, Segev A. Auctions on the internet: a field study[R].Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley, 2001.
  • 4Pinker E J, Seidmann A, Vakrat Y. The design of online auctions:business issues and current research [R]. The University of Rochester,2001.
  • 5Seidmann A,Pinker E J, Vakrat Y. The optimal design of multi-period online auctions[C]//East Coast Round Table in Operations Research: Operations Research Models in Ecommerce. University of Rochester,2001.
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二级参考文献6

  • 1Beam C, Segev A. Auction on the Internet: A Field Study[R]. Haas School of Bussiness, University of California Berkeley, 2001.
  • 2Pinker E J, Seidmann A, Vakrat Y. The Design of Online Auctions: Business Issues and Current Research[R]. The University of Rochester, 2001.
  • 3Seidmann A, Pinker E J, Vakrat Y. The Optimal Design of Multi-Period Online Auctions[A]. East Coast Round Table in Operations Research: Operations Research Models in e-commerce[C]. University of Rochester, 2001.
  • 4Arora A, Xu H, Padman R, et al. Optimal Bidding in Sequential Online Auctions[R]. 2003.
  • 5Klemperer P. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature[J]. Journal of Economic Survey, 1999, 13(3): 227-286.
  • 6Feng J,Chatterjee K. One Auction or Two: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Sales in Multi-unit Auctions[R]. The Pennsylvania State University, 2002-09-01.

共引文献4

武汉科技大学学报
2007年 第3期

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