上市公司资本结构、管理者利益侵占与公司业绩

Capital Structure,Manager Expropriation and Firm Performance

文章认为上市公司资本结构、管理者利益侵占与公司业绩三者之间存在相互影响关系。我们选取1997-2004年深沪两市610家上市公司，组成平衡面板数据作为研究对象，建立联立方程，扩展了以往的研究成果。实证结果表明，资本结构、管理者利益侵占与公司业绩三者之间存在相互影响关系。资本结构对管理者利益侵占行为产生显著的正向影响，这表明负债融资不能抑制管理者的利益侵占行为；资本结构对公司业绩的影响是非线性的，存在“倒U型”的相关关系，这一结果支持动态权衡理论，证实了目标资本结构的存在，同时，管理者利益侵占会对公司业绩产生显著的负向影响。

By building simultaneous the panel data from 1997 to 2004, this equations and using 602 samples in paper extends the early research results. Its empirical results indicate that there exist interactions among capital structure, manager expropriation and firm performance. Capital structure has a significant positive influence on manager expropriation, which means leverage can not restrain managers from expropriation behavior. Meanwhile, there exists a nonlinear inverse U shape relationship between capital structure and firm performance, which is in favor of the dynamic tradeoff theory. This nonlinear relationship testifies the existence of target capital structure and is consistent with our past result. Finally, we find that manager expropriation has a negative influence on firm performance.