摘要
谢林对博弈论与战略互动的分析以国际政治的“非零和游戏”特征为基本假定,他超越了理性主义的研究范畴,关注非理性因素在战略互动中的作用,并试图对非理性行为加以分析。战略行动的本质是通过自己的行动去影响他人对自己将如何行动的期望从而影响他人的选择,并最终形成有利于自己的结果。
Thomas C. Shelling＇s analysis of game theory and strategic interaction is based on the fundamental assumption that international politics is characterized by non-zero sum game. He transcends the scope of rationalism study, focusing his attention on the role of the irrational factor in strategic interaction; and tries to analyze irrational behavior. The essence of a strategic action is to influence, by one＇s own action, other people＇s expectation of how one will act, and thereby influence their choice, so that an outcome can finally be achieved to one＇s own advantage.
关键词
博弈论
战略互动
理性主义
game theory
strategic interaction
rationalism
