控股股东与小股东之间的代理问题:来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Agency Problem between Controlling Shareholder and Minority Shareholder:exemplified through China's Listed Companies

本文分析中国上市公司控股股东与小股东之间的代理问题。我们将持股比例达到或超过30%的股东定义为控股股东。实证检验结果发现,有控股股东存在的公司,其市场价值显著低于无控股股东存在的公司;控股股东担任上市公司高级管理者的公司,其市场价值显著低于控股股东不担任上市公司高级管理者的公司。而且,控股股东持股比例对公司价值具有显著的负面影响。本文还发现,不同类型的控股股东控制的上市公司,其市场价值也显著不同。特别地,政府作为上市公司最终控股股东的公司,其市场价值显著低于家族、外资和集体企业作为最终控股股东的公司。本文将有控股股东存在的公司相对于无控股股东存在的公司的市场价值折扣率定义为控股股东的代理成本,平均而言,这种代理成本高达13%—24%。以上实证检验结果表明,中国上市公司控股股东与小股东之间确实存在严重的代理问题,当政府作为上市公司的最终控股股东时,这种代理问题更加严重。

The paper examines the agency problems between controlling shareholder (CS) and minority shareholders in China's listed companies. Shareholders who hold more than 30% of the ownership of a listed company are defined as CS in this paper. Empirical results show that firms with CS and CS officers have higher market value than firms without them. Ownership held by CS is negatively correlated to firm value. Firms with different identities of CS have different market value.Specially,firms with government as the ultimate CS have lower market value than firms with family, foreign owner or collective owner as the ultimate CS. In this paper the percentage of value discount of firms with CS in relation to firms without CS is defined as agency costs of CS. The agency costs of CS averages 13%-24% .The above empirical results suggest that the agency problems of CS do exist in China's listed companies.And specially, the agency problems of CS are especially serious in firms with government as the ultimate CS.