摘要
价格失信行为的根本原因在于人性中的机会主义倾向,而机会主义行为得以实施必需两个条件:第一,机会主义行为产生的前提是信息不对称。现实社会中,信息是不对称的,一般说,卖方比买方具有更多关于商品价格方面的信息,卖方就可能利用自己的信息优势欺骗买方;第二,机会主义行为产生的动机在失信收益大于失信成本。所以,通过相应的制度安排,消解机会主义产生的前提——信息不对称、抑制机会主义产生的动机——较高的收益预期,是减少和杜绝价格失信的关键。
The absence of credit in price is mainly attributed to oppoaunism inclination of human nature. Opportunism behaviors come into force relying on two conditions: First, the prerequisite of opportunism behavior is asymmetric information. In real society, information is asymmetric. Generally speaking, a seller may possess more information about commodity price than a buyer, and then a seller with information advantage may deceive a buyer. Second, the motives of opportunism behavior are depended on that the benefit exceeds the cost of being dishonest. In order to eliminate the prerequisite of opportunism behavior-- asymmetric information and to constrain the motives of opportunism behavior--higher benefit expeetations, some institution arrangements must be established.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第6期69-75,共7页
Finance & Economics
基金
"中流文教基金会及喜马拉雅研究发展基金"资助课题阶段性研究成果
关键词
机会主义
价格诚信
制度安排
opportunism
price credit
institution arrangement