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机会主义、价格诚信与制度安排 被引量:6

Opportunism,Price,Credit and Institution Arrangement
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摘要 价格失信行为的根本原因在于人性中的机会主义倾向,而机会主义行为得以实施必需两个条件:第一,机会主义行为产生的前提是信息不对称。现实社会中,信息是不对称的,一般说,卖方比买方具有更多关于商品价格方面的信息,卖方就可能利用自己的信息优势欺骗买方;第二,机会主义行为产生的动机在失信收益大于失信成本。所以,通过相应的制度安排,消解机会主义产生的前提——信息不对称、抑制机会主义产生的动机——较高的收益预期,是减少和杜绝价格失信的关键。 The absence of credit in price is mainly attributed to oppoaunism inclination of human nature. Opportunism behaviors come into force relying on two conditions: First, the prerequisite of opportunism behavior is asymmetric information. In real society, information is asymmetric. Generally speaking, a seller may possess more information about commodity price than a buyer, and then a seller with information advantage may deceive a buyer. Second, the motives of opportunism behavior are depended on that the benefit exceeds the cost of being dishonest. In order to eliminate the prerequisite of opportunism behavior-- asymmetric information and to constrain the motives of opportunism behavior--higher benefit expeetations, some institution arrangements must be established.
出处 《财经科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第6期69-75,共7页 Finance & Economics
基金 "中流文教基金会及喜马拉雅研究发展基金"资助课题阶段性研究成果
关键词 机会主义 价格诚信 制度安排 opportunism price credit institution arrangement
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