摘要
自由意志在消极层面是非依赖性状态,从积极层面讲是自主选择的状态,与人在道义上的责任性联系在一起,是一种“二阶愿望”能力。康德在设定“自由意志”之存在的同时,却无力使人们将这种抽象的主体的自由的“规定”真正在人身付诸实现,关键在于他还没有将这种道德意志真正内在化,与生命自身的良知性的动力统一起来。在王阳明那里,道德理性与人的内在的道德情感本体是同一的,良知本体的自我裁断和自我意志冲动,使人的身心之间、知行之间的冲突协调并成为一个统一体,使道德理性在人身现实化,是为自由意志的真正实现。
Negatively, free will indicates a non - dependent state, and positively it is a state of autonomous selection and links up with human moral obligations. Kant assumes the existence of free will, but he fails to put such an abstract "postulation" of the subject's freedom into effect in man. Crucially, he fails to truly internalize the moral will and unite it with life's intelligent driving force. As to Wang Yang - ming, moral reason is identical with human inherent moral sentiments. Both the intelligent self- decision and the impetus of egoist will make conflicts between human body and mind and between knowing and doing coordinated and integrated.
出处
《华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第3期25-28,41,共5页
Journal of East China Normal University(Humanities and Social Sciences)
关键词
自由意志
知行合一
良知
free will, Kant, Wang Yang- ming, union of knowing and doing