摘要
作者试图分析两个问题:如果要研究由非合作博弈发展出合作的可能性,什么样的理论实验博弈的设计才是合理和普遍有效的;什么是最可能形成合作的条件。其中以罗尔斯、艾克斯罗德和哈贝马斯的设想作为具体分析案例,分别指出这些方案在游戏设计上存在着不合理的游戏条件,从而导致对合作的错误理解。最后,作者改造了中国关于和谐的传统概念,提出一种比帕累托改进更有利于形成合作的“孔子改进”。
This paper is an analysis of two problems: what is a reasonable and universally good design for a theoretical experimental game to investigate the possibility of cooperation in a non-cooperational game? and what are the available and accessible conditions leading to cooperation? The author argues that the unreasonable designs in the games of Rawls, Axelrod, and Habermas have resulted in some misunderstandings about cooperation. Finally, the author discusses a so-called “Confucian Improvement,” a rewritten theory of the Chinese traditional idea of harmony and suggests a game that is much easier than Pareto’s to develop cooperation.
出处
《世界经济与政治》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第6期6-16,共11页
World Economics and Politics