国有上市公司民营化的治理与产业重组效应——基于公司民营化程度的比较

Governance Effect and Restructuring Effect of Property Right Reform among Chinese State-owned Listed Companies:A Comparative Study of Level of Privatization

通过研究国有上市公司两类民营化改制路径的治理效应与产业重组效应,发现大股东控制权超过现金流权导致的潜在代理冲突并没有随着民营化而得到缓解,甚至在部分民营化公司中更为严重;民营化后的产业重组效应也没有表现出大股东利益与公司利益相一致的激励;在经济后果上部分民营化公司业绩的改善差于完全民营化公司。

This paper first analyzes the gap between control rights and cash-flow rights of new private owners after state property right transformation in China listed companies. The gap still remains while the gap of partial transformation is even wider. The restructuring effect that doesn＇t demonstrate new private shareholders＇ interest is compatible with that of the company and finally points out that the performance of partial privatization is no better than that of the entire one.