摘要
根据信息经济学的基本理论,应用数理模型探讨中小企业会计信息质量与中小企业融资的关系,得出的结论是:在中小企业无足够抵押担保品等违约损失的前提下,虽然提高会计信息质量部分解决了信息不对称问题,但并未解决由此产生的逆向选择和道德风险,在一定情况下还可能加大逆向选择和道德风险.只有提高会计信息质量能够为中小企业带来效益时,提高会计信息质量才有现实意义.如果企业违约损失达到足够的额度以后,无论企业会计信息质量好坏,都能避免产生逆向选择和道德风险.
According to the basic theory of information economics, by applying a mathematical model, the paper discusses the relationship between the accounting information quality and financing small and medium enterprises. The conclusion is as follows:Under the premise that small and medium enterprises have no sufficient collateral security for LGD,although raising the quality of accounting information can resolve part of information asymmetry problem, it can not resolve the reverse choice and moral hazard from this. It may even enlarge these in some situation. Improving the accounting iniormation quality may have practical significance only when it can bring benefit for enterprises. If the LGD of enterprises reaches enough amount, regardless of the accounting information quality, it can avoid having the reversion choice and the moral hazard.
出处
《湖北民族学院学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
2007年第2期230-233,共4页
Journal of Hubei Minzu University(Natural Science Edition)
关键词
中小企业
会计信息质量
逆向选择
道德风险
small and medium enterprises
quality of accounting information
reverse choice
moral hazard