中国食品安全规制问题研究被引量：13

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摘要本文利用动态博弈模型分析市场信息不对称条件下我国食品生产商和规制者的博弈行为,博弈的均衡结果是规制者和厂商进行合谋,进而使得食品市场的信用环境遭到破坏,消费者的权益受损。声誉模型作为非正式制度安排有助于解决交易双方的信息不对称问题,论文在此分析的逻辑框架内提出了相应的政策和建议。

作者安丰东

机构地区山东财政学院经济学系

出处《消费经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第3期74-77,共4页 Consumer Economics

关键词食品安全信息不对称声誉模型规制

参考文献10

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