摘要
传统观点认为先天真理一定是必然真理,后天真理一定是偶然真理,S.克里普克对此提出了挑战。他主张所有的名称的同一性陈述都是必然的,虽然它们常常只能凭经验才能被认识。对此我们可以给出如下解释:名称的同一性陈述并非关于世界是怎样的,它们的真假仅由我们的语言决定。但我们的语言并非与实际世界完全脱离,而是在实际世界中通过我们的活动建立的。这就是后天必然真理之所以可能。
S. Kripke challenges the traditional view that a priori truth must be necessarily true and a posteriori truth must be contingently true. He argues that all true identical statements of names are necessarily true, though they often only can be known by experience. An explanation of this can be given as follows: Identical statements are not about how the world is and their truth is only determined by our language. But our language is not totally separated from active world because it is established in active world through our activity. This is why a posteriori necessary truth is possible.
出处
《四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第3期83-87,共5页
Journal of Sichuan University:Philosophy and Social Science Edition
关键词
克里普克
后天必然真理
可能世界
名称理论
指称
Kripke
a posteriori necessary truth
possible world
theory of name
reference