企业年金基金委托投资中的代理问题分析

The Analyzing of Agency Problems during the Principal-investment of the Occupational Pension

企业年金基金委托投资中由于信息不对称和委托代理双方的目标函数不一致,不可避免地会出现代理问题:“逆选择”、不完备契约、“道德风险”等。为了保证代理人的行为不偏离或损害委托人的利益,作为委托人一方的企业年金理事会必须加强激励机制和约束机制的建设。合理的薪酬契约和资格拍卖制度的建立,将促使处于信息优势地位的基金管理公司实现信息自显,从而实现二者利益的最佳结合,达到激励约束相容状态。

For the reason of the asymmetric information and the different aim - function, it is inevitable to break out agency problems during the course of the occupational pension＇s investment, including adverse selection,incomplete contract and normal risk. In order to protect the principals＇ benefits, the board of the occupational pension fund should strengthen the construction of the incentive and constraint mechanisms ： the founding of proper salary contract and auction constitution make the fund management companies show their monopoly information, which will realize the perfect joining of the benefits and achieve the state of the incentive compatibility constrains.