关联交易与控制性股东的“隧道行为”

An Empirical Study on Related Party Transactions and Expropriation of Controlling Shareholders

在信息不对称情况下,控制性股东能够利用其对上市公司的控制力或影响力进行非公允关联交易,从而以其他投资者的利益为代价从上市公司攫取财富。本文以1998—2005年实施配股的上市公司为样本,分析了配股后上市公司关联交易的分布特征,并研究了关联交易对控制性股东资金占用行为、股票收益和企业价值的影响。研究结果表明:(1)控制性股东通过关联借贷大量侵占了上市公司的资金;(2)投资者在关联交易发生后相应调整了股票价格,导致了上市公司股票收益下降;(3)控制性股东通过隐蔽的关联交易从上市公司输出了财富,造成了以托宾Q衡量的公司价值下降,关联交易与公司价值之间存在负相关关系。非公允关联交易成为控制性股东掠夺中小股东财富的重要方式,导致上市公司的资源被不断输送出去。

Under asymmetric information, controlling shareholders will produce unfair related party transaction through its controlling power. This paper investigates the characteristics of related party transactions between listed companies and their controlling shareholders, the effects of related party transaction on capital occupation, stock return and firm＇s value by utilizing the samples of stock dividends in listed companies in China during 1998-2005. The result show that large shareholders occupy large amount of money through related party transactions. In addition, investors adjust stock prices downwards and stock returns decline. Finally controlling shareholders gain from listed firms by related party transactions and induce negative correlation between related party transactions and firm＇ s value measured by Tobin＇s Q.