摘要
管理层持股作为长期激励机制,有助于解决股东与经营者之间的代理问题,并实现剩余索取权和控制权的对应,因而能鼓励经理人员克服短期行为,更多地关注公司的长期持续发展。“管理层增量持股”是国企深化改革过程中值得探索的方式之一,其激励效应在实际运作过程中还存在一定的不确定性,应该审慎而又积极地尝试。
As a long-term stimulating mechanism, Executive Stock Option (ESO)is helpful for solving the agent problem between the shareholders and the managers, realizing the correspondence between the residual claim and control right, encouraging managers to overcome short-term behavior and pay more attention to the company' s sustainable development. Increment of Executive Stock Option is one of the ways deserving of exploring, through which state-owned enterprises deepen their reform in China. But its stimulating effect is uncertain in actual operating process. To try actively and prudently is necessary.
出处
《安徽农业大学学报(社会科学版)》
2007年第3期53-55,109,共4页
Journal of Anhui Agricultural University:SOC.SCI.
关键词
国有企业
管理层增量持股
激励效应
state-owned enterprise
the increment of Executive Stock Option
stim^ating effect