环境管制、产品质量与企业收益——兼论污染罚金政策的使用效率

Environmental Regulation, Product Quality and Profit of Enterprises——Research on the Efficiency of Pollution Fines Policy

本文引入消费者效用函数、政府环境管制成本函数、企业生产成本函数,研究了环境管制对企业产品质量和利润的影响。研究表明:(1)在政府财政收入最大化的条件下,政府对企业征收污染罚金是不会让污染生产的企业退出市场的;(2)在政府财政收入最大化、消费者效用最大化和企业利润最大化的均衡条件下,政府征收污染罚金时,会降低产品环境质量;(3)政府加大罚金力度会提高生产清洁产品企业的净收益,而降低生产污染产品企业的净收益,并且清洁生产企业的利润比污染生产企业的利润高;(4)政府如果放弃财政收入最大化目标,对清洁生产的企业予以激励,对污染的企业在说服教育的基础上采用创新弃权书的管制方式,否则即对其征收罚金,这样会使两类企业都进行清洁生产。这些结论表明政府对污染生产企业征收罚金时,重在引导教育并建立激励型生态补偿制度,注重政策的使用效率。

The paper utilizes a consumer＇s utility function, government cost function and enterprise cost function to analyze the effects of environmental regulation on product quality and the profit of enterprises. The paper demonstrates that （ 1 ） under the condition of government maximizing financial incomes, the government won＇t allow the enterprises to retreat from the market; （2） Under the condition of governments maximizing financial incomes, consumers maximizing utilities and enterprises maximizing profit, environmental regulation will debase environmental quality of products; （3） The more fines that the government levies, the lower environmental quality of products in the market. The government environmental regulation will increase the profit of enterprise that produces clean products, and reduce the profit of enterprise that produce pollutive products; （4） If the government abandons financial incomes and gives subsidy to enterprises that manufactures clean products and induces enterprise that manufactures pollutive products to manufactures clean products, both of them will manufacture clean products. This demonstrates that the government should pay attention to the efficiency of environmental regulation.